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Abstract 
Different theoretical views exist regarding whether false memories contain perceptual 
information or are merely conceptual in nature. To address this question, we conducted three 
experiments to examine whether false memories for pictures had a priming effect on a perceptual 
closure task. In Experiment 1, participants were presented with pictorial versions of 
Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) lists and received a recognition task. Finally, in the 
perceptual closure task (PCT), participants were shown degraded pictures (studied pictures, 
critical pictures, unrelated pictures) that became clearer over time and had to identify the object 
depicted as quickly as possible. The results showed that false memories for pictures did not 
exhibit a priming effect in the PCT. Specifically, picture identifications based on false memories 
for visual stimuli were significantly slower than those based on true memories and the former did 
not differ from that of unrelated items. In Experiments 2 and 3, we manipulated the modality 
(verbal vs. pictorial) of the study phase and the PCT phase. In both experiments, false memories 
for pictures primed pictures significantly slower than true memories in the pictorial PCT, but 
false memories for pictures primed words faster than true memories in the verbal PCT. Our 
results suggest that false memories for pictures are unlikely to contain perceptual information but 
rather that they are conceptual in nature. 
 
Keywords: false memory, memory representation, perceptual closure task, DRM paradigm 
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The Nature and Consequences of False Memories for Visual Stimuli 
 
It is not uncommon that you falsely remember when you had your meeting or where you 
dated your girlfriend a year ago. What matters is whether these memory distortions will result in 
any unwanted consequences. False memories are commonly associated with negative 
consequences such as false accusations of child sexual abuse (Otgaar, Sauerland, & Petrila, 2013).  
However, in recent years, studies have accumulated showing that false memories have adaptive 
value and can be beneficial under certain circumstances (Howe, 2011; Schacter, 2012). As many 
of these beneficial effects of false memories have been observed with verbal stimuli, the general 
aim of the current study is to investigate whether these same positive outcomes generalize to 
visual stimuli. 
For example, a series of studies have demonstrated that false memories facilitate problem-
solving behavior equivalent to or better than true memories (Howe, Garner, Dewhurst, & Ball, 
2010; Howe, Garner, & Patel, 2013; Howe, Wilkinson, Garner, & Ball, 2016; Wang, Otgaar, 
Howe, Smeets, Merkelbach, & Nahouli, 2016). In these studies, participants are usually presented 
with associated lists (e.g., women, husband, uncle, lady, male) using the well-known 
Deese/Roediger-McDermott paradigm (DRM; Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). 
After the presentation of such DRM lists, participants commonly falsely recollect the non-
presented ‘critical lure’ word (i.e., man) which is associatively related to each of the list words. 
Then, participants are asked to solve compound remote associate task problems. Each problem is 
a three-word puzzle (e.g., old/hole/super) and they have to come up with a theme word (in this 
case, man) that could link all the three words. Importantly, when the solutions are the non-
presented critical lures, participants solve these problems in a more efficient way than when the 
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solutions are the words presented on the lists. Not only when using compound remote associate 
problems do false memories exert positive consequences, but also with analogical reasoning 
problems in both children (Howe, Threadgold, Norbury, Garner, & Ball, 2013) and adults (Howe, 
Garner, Threadgold, & Ball, 2015). 
Additional studies have concentrated on the positive priming effects of false memories on an 
adapted perceptual closure task (PCT) – a measure loosely linked to intelligence (Otgaar, Howe, 
Beers, van Hoof, Bronzwaer, & Smeets, 2015). In this PCT, participants are presented with 
degraded stimuli that become clearer over time and they have to indicate what the stimuli are 
(e.g., a certain word) as soon as they recognize the stimuli. The PCT requires people to fill in the 
missing parts of a degraded image, which is similar to subtasks in certain intelligence tasks 
(Luteijn & Barelds, 2004). In Otgaar et al.’s (2015) study, participants received DRM lists and a 
recognition test and they were then exposed to the PCT (Experiment 1).  Here, they were 
presented with degraded versions of both presented words and the critical lures. The significant 
finding was that false memories for the critical lures primed the PCT faster than the presented 
words. The same finding emerged when no recognition task was included (Experiment 2). Again, 
this is evidence indicating the processing advantages associated with false over true memories. 
The above lines of research clearly demonstrate the positive value of false memories. 
However, these findings may be somewhat limited inasmuch as the stimuli used in these studies 
were purely conceptual (i.e., words) and no studies have examined whether false memories for 
pictures have any positive consequence on cognitive tasks such as the PCT. This question is 
important for the following reasons. First, research dealing with visual false memories is limited 
(see Miller & Gazzaniga, 1998), but studies that have been conducted reveal that false memory 
rates for pictures differ from false memories for words. For example, Israel and Schacter (1997) 
found that false memories for pictures resulted in significantly lower acceptance rates than verbal 
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false memories (see also Howe, 2006). When false memories are derived from visual scenes, 
recognition rates for critical lures were relative low as well (~30%; Otgaar, Howe, Peters, Smeets, 
& Moritz, 2014). One possible explanation for these differences in false memory rates is 
distinctiveness. That is, pictures contain more details which are distinct from each another and 
this tends to weaken the associatively-based generation of false memories (Koutstaal, Schacter, & 
Brenner, 2001; Seamon, Luo, Schlegel, Greene, & Goldenberg, 2000). So, the cognitive 
processes underlying visual and verbal false memories might be different, and hence, it is 
unknown whether false memories for visual stimuli also exert positive influences on subsequent 
priming tasks.  
Second, spreading activation theories (Howe, Wimmer, Gagnon, & Plumpton, 2009; 
Roediger, Balota, & Watson, 2001) have been put forward to explain the positive consequences 
of associatively generated (e.g., verbal) false memories. In these activation theories, DRM list 
members (nodes) are embedded within an associative network. Activation of one conceptual node 
spreads to other related nodes. Activation of related but non-presented concepts not only leads to 
false recall/recognition of non-presented words but also triggers additional spreading activation 
that impacts performance on related (e.g., associative) tasks (Howe et al., 2010; Otgaar et al., 
2015). When visual stimuli are presented and visual false memories are induced, it is unclear 
whether visual representations are integrated in this network and thus, it is unclear whether they 
will result in any positive priming consequences.  
In theories about how information is represented in memory (e.g., Dual Coding Theory), it is 
thought that pictures are encoded in parallel into both imaginal and verbal representations (Paivio, 
1991; Sadoski & Paivio, 2004). If false memories derived from visual stimuli also contain 
perceptual representations, false memories for pictures should facilitate priming on 
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imagery/perceptual tasks. Studying the consequences of visual false memories on a priming task 
might help uncover the mechanism underlying false memories.  
Perceptual vs. Conceptual False Memories 
Indeed, there is no consensus regarding whether false memories encompass a perceptual 
mental representation in the same way that true memories do. One line of research favors the 
view that the memory representation for DRM critical lures contains perceptual details. For 
instance, McDermott (1997) had participants study DRM lists and then perform a word-stem 
completion task (e.g., bas___ for the target basket) or a fragment completion task (e.g., b_s___ 
for the target basket). These tasks were referred to as perceptual priming tasks by the author. The 
results showed that critical lures had a significant priming effect on the stem/fragment completion 
rates as compared to non-studied items, although the level of priming was not as strong as studied 
items. McKone and Murphy (2000) replicated McDermott’s (1997) results and even found that 
the magnitude of critical lures’ priming effect was equivalent to that of studied items. The 
priming effects of critical lures were also found in other studies involving similar tasks such as a 
lexical decision task (i.e., to classify stimuli as words or nonwords) (Tajika, Neumann, Hamajima, 
& Iwahara, 2005; Tse & Neely, 2005, 2007).  
The opponent view is that false memories for critical lures do not contain perceptual 
information. For example, Hicks and Starns (2005) manipulated the study modality of DRM lists 
(visual vs. auditory presentation) to examine whether critical lure priming was modality specific. 
The logic was that, if critical lures are perceptually encoded, visual DRM lists should induce 
visually encoded critical lures and auditory lists should lead to auditory encodings of critical lures. 
Thus, critical lure priming of the visual stem completion task should only exist in the visual study 
modality but not in the auditory study modality. Hicks and Starns (2005) found that critical lures 
had a higher word-stem completion rate than non-studied items in both the visual and auditory 
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study modalities, which suggested activations of critical lures are not perceptual but perhaps 
conceptual in nature. In addition to failures to find modality-specific priming effects for critical 
lures (but see McKone & Murphy, 2000, for a report of modality specificity), there are studies 
where critical lure priming was not found (or was restricted) in the lexical decision task (McKone, 
2004; Meade, Watson, Balota, & Roediger, 2007) and in the stem completion task when 
participants did not attempt to retrieve words from the study phase (McBride, Coane, & 
Raulerson, 2006). 
Importantly, different theoretical hypotheses about the mechanisms of false memory 
activation underlie these contrasting views. The Implicit Associative Response hypothesis (IAR; 
e.g., Underwood, 1965; McDermott, 1997) proposes that the presence of a word (e.g., table) may 
activate the encoding of a related/critical word (e.g., chair). The IAR does not predict perceptual 
priming of critical lures directly. McKone and Murphy (2000) extended it to the IAR/imagery 
hypothesis (see also Hicks & Starns, 2005) in that the critical item might be encoded in the 
specific modality during the study phase (e.g., visual lists create visual (perceptual) 
representations of critical lures). Thus, critical lures are related to perceptual characteristics from 
a specific modality, which can explain why critical lures were effective in perceptual priming 
tasks. Alternatively, theories of false memory activation predict conceptual critical lure priming 
effects. The activation-monitoring (Roediger et al., 2001) and the associative-activation (Howe et 
al., 2009) theories suggest that processing of one concept activates a corresponding conceptual 
node and this activation spreads to surrounding associative concept nodes. When the DRM list 
items are presented, their shared associative concept – the critical lure – is most likely to be 
activated during encoding. Thus, these activation theories predict conceptual priming for critical 
lures as critical lures in the DRM paradigm primarily result from conceptual activation. However, 
it is also possible that perceptual features are stored along with the “nodes” in the associative 
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network or they are integrated in the network in some way (Howe et al., 2009). For instance, false 
memories can be induced by phonologically related lists (e.g., fat, cab, sat, for the critical lure cat; 
Sommers & Lewis, 1999) and recently Finley, Sungkhasettee, Roediger, and Balota (2017) found 
that hybrid lists of conceptual and phonological items produced higher false memory rates than 
purely conceptual lists.  
The main evidence that either supports or refutes the perceptual priming hypothesis for 
critical lures comes from data in priming tasks including the stem completion task (Hicks & 
Starns, 2005; McDermott, 1997; McKone & Murphy, 2000), the fragment completion task 
(McDermott, 1997), the anagram task (Lövdén & Johansson, 2003), the lexical decision task 
(McKone, 2004; Tse & Neely, 2005, 2007) and perceptual identification of degraded words 
(Hicks & Starns, 2005; Otgaar et al., 2015), all of which concern completing/identifying a word, 
(i.e., verbal in nature). We argue that there are two possible confounding factors in this previous 
research. First, the nature of these verbal priming tasks (perceptual vs. conceptual) is 
controversial in that some consider the stem completion task as conceptual not perceptual (Brown 
& Mitchell, 1994; Horton, Wilson, & Evans, 2001). Indeed, research has found that articulatory 
(verbal) suppression mediated critical lure priming in the stem completion task and in the 
anagram task (Lövdén & Johansson, 2003; Van Damme, Menten, & d’Ydewalle, 2010). For 
instance, when participants repeatedly said out loud the word “Coca-Cola” during encoding of 
DRM lists, critical lure priming disappeared. This suggests that verbal “perceptual” tasks might 
have a conceptual component, as purely perceptual tasks should not be affected by verbal 
suppression (Van Damme, Menten, & d’Ydewalle, 2010). To examine the nature of critical lures’ 
memory traces, an unambiguous perceptual task needs to be used. Second, for verbal stimuli (i.e., 
words), it is difficult to completely dissociate perceptual information from conceptual meanings 
as words themselves usually constitute meanings (e.g., Can you communicate the meaning of 
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“hot” without the word hot?). Thus, verbal stimuli might not be the best way to study the 
perceptual/conceptual nature of false memories’ mental representations. 
The Present Study 
To deal with the above concerns, the present study used picture stimuli and a pictorial 
perceptual closure task to explore the consequences of false memories for visual stimuli and to 
test the perceptual/conceptual nature of false memories’ mental representations. In Experiment 1, 
we evoked false memories for pictures by presenting pictorial versions of the DRM lists (see 
Israel & Schacter, 1997). Then, participants completed a recognition test to measure their false 
memory levels. Finally, participants received the pictorial PCT in which they were asked to 
identify degraded pictures of the studied (true) items as well as the critical lures as quickly as 
possible. Experiment 1 examined what consequences visual false memories might have on the 
identification performance of the PCT. In line with recent findings of the positive consequences 
of verbal false memories (Howe et al., 2010, 2011, 2013, 2015, 2016; Otgaar et al, 2015), one 
might expect to find that visual false memories are more easily recognized than visual true 
memories on the PCT. However, predictions can be made based on contrasting hypotheses about 
the nature of mental representation of false memories for visual stimuli. According to the dual 
coding theory, true memories for pictures are stored as both imaginal (perceptual) and verbal 
(conceptual) representations (Paivio, 1991). For instance, after seeing an image of a car, people 
will encode perceptual details such as shape and color of the car and they will also encode the 
concept “car”, which is verbal or linguistic. If false memories for visual stimuli also contain 
imagery representations, critical lure images should prime the pictorial PCT as fast as studied 
pictures. Conversely, if false memories for pictures are not perceptually based, false memories 
for visual stimuli might not prime the PCT as fast as presented pictures. In Experiments 2 and 3, 
we tested whether false memories for visual stimuli are conceptual (i.e., in a verbal form) in 
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nature. We manipulated the modality of the study phase (picture vs. word) and modality of the 
PCT (picture vs. word). If false memory activations for critical pictures are conceptual, false 
memories for pictures should have a priming effect on the verbal PCT (i.e. identifying words).   
  
Experiment 1 
 Before conducting Experiment 1, we conducted a pilot experiment with an identical 
procedure as in the current experiment. Based on the results from the pilot experiment, we have 
achieved effect sizes to estimate the sample size of Experiment 1 and we have obtained materials 
that are suitable for testing our hypotheses (for details see the supplementary materials).  
Method 
Participants 
Based on the data from the pilot experiment (see supplementary materials), the Cohen’s d 
between the studied items and critical lures was from 0.52~ 0.76. To determine the sample size, 
we estimated the effect size as medium (d = 0.5). Using the software G*Power 3.1 (Faul, 
Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007), power analysis showed that thirty-four participants were 
needed when d was estimated as 0.5 and power was estimated as 0.80. Forty-five participants 
took part in this experiment. One participant was excluded due to misunderstanding of the 
instructions. Out of the 44 participants left, 6 were males and 38 females (Mage = 22.39, SD = 
5.59) with age ranging from 19 to 54 years old. They received credit points or a financial 
compensation (€7.50). The experiment was approved by the ethical committee of the Faculty of 
Psychology and Neuroscience, Maastricht University. 
Materials 
Study phase. In the current experiment, nine DRM wordlists that could be represented 
pictorially were chosen from Peters, Jelicic, and Merckelbach (2015). Each DRM list included 
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eight associated words (e.g., truck, bus, train, jeep, etc.) and these words were all related to a 
non-presented target or “critical lure” (i.e., car). In this experiment, we used pictorial versions of 
the DRM words (see also Israel & Schacter, 1997; Schacter, Israel, & Racine, 1999). The pictures 
were collected by means of a Google Images search. For example, for the word “truck”, we 
searched for a picture of a “truck” using the Google Image search engine. All pictures were 
showing objects in the center (e.g., car, bread, pen) with a white background (see Appendix A 
for the DRM lists). To have a rough index that our chosen studied items and critical lures did not 
differ on certain critical dimensions, we looked at the following issues. First, we obtained the 
concreteness ratings (1 to 7) for the DRM list words (M= 6.0, SD = 0.55) and critical lures (M= 
5.7, SD = 0.88) from Nelson, McEvoy, and Schreiber (1998) and found no significant difference 
between list words and critical lures (p > .05). Second, for the pictures of the DRM lists and 
critical lures, we asked a pilot sample of participants (n = 11, Mage = 24.1, SD = 4.66; 55% 
female) to name the objects in the pictures. 96.34% of the DRM pictures and 99.5% of the critical 
lure pictures were named correctly. Collectively, these analyses showed that our visual stimuli 
were concrete enough to be identified and would not lead to multiple interpretations. The pictures 
were presented digitally for 1000ms, with 1000ms inter-stimulus interval using E-Prime 2.0 
software. Pictures within each list were presented in descending associative order. 
Recognition test. The recognition test included 72 pictures in total. Of these pictures, 36 
pictures were presented in the study phase (e.g., pictures of truck, bus, train, etc.; four randomly 
selected pictures per list), 9 were pictures of critical lures (e.g., image of car), 9 were not 
presented but related pictures (e.g., image depicting bicycle) and 18 were not presented and 
unrelated pictures (e.g. pictures of tree, washing machine, glasses, etc.). Each picture was shown 
briefly for 100 ms and there was a fixation cross on screen lasting 1500 ms after each picture. 
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Figure 1. Diagram of procedure (CL: Critical Lures). 
Perceptual closure task. The perceptual closure task (PCT) contained 108 pictures. Of all 
these pictures, 72 were studied pictures (36 were shown in the recognition test and 36 were not), 
9 were pictures of critical lures from the recognition test, 9 were new pictures of the critical lures 
and 18 were unrelated pictures (9 were from the recognition test and 9 were not). As Figure 1 
shows, for each kind of memory type (studied items, critical lures, unrelated), half of the pictures 
were shown during the recognition test and the other half was not. For instance, there were two 
sets of pictures for the critical lures. One set (9 pictures) were shown in the recognition test, the 
other set (9 new pictures of the critical lures) were not included in the recognition test but were 
tested directly in PCT (see Figure 1). For the 72 studied pictures, half were presented both in the 
DRM lists and in the recognition test while the other half were only shown in the DRM lists but 
not included in the recognition test. The pictures were displayed with a distortion filter that 
enabled the pictures to become clearer over time. We included 9 gradual gradations of blur, and 
the last one was the original picture (see Appendix B). Each blur was presented for 1 second and 
participants were asked to respond within 10 seconds. This task provides measures of both the 
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accuracy and the reaction times for the identification of the pictures using the software E-Prime 
2.0. The distorted pictures were created using GIMP 2.0. 
Design and Procedure 
    A 3 (Memory type: studied items, critical lures, unrelated) × 2 (Recognition presentation: 
yes vs. no) within-subject design was used. Because the PCT is a priming task, the mere 
presentation of pictures in the recognition test might confound the results (but see Otgaar et al., 
2015). In order to control the possible priming effect from the recognition test, a random half of 
the studied pictures in the PCT were presented in the recognition test and the other half were not 
shown during the recognition test. For the critical lures in the PCT, two versions of pictures for 
the same critical lure were prepared; one version was presented in the recognition test and the 
other was not. It was the same manipulation with unrelated pictures that half of the unrelated 
pictures were included in the recognition test and the other half were only shown during the PCT. 
Participants were tested individually for approximately 45 minutes in lab facilities. First, 
participants were shown 9 pictorial DRM lists, with order of the lists randomized. Participants 
were instructed to memorize each picture and think about the concept of the picture when they 
saw it on the screen. After the presentation of all pictures, participants played Tetris for 5 min 
(filler task). Next, participants received the recognition test, during which pictures were 
subsequently presented and participants were asked to answer “yes” or “no” in a pop-up window 
to indicate whether they had seen the picture before or not. Finally, following five minutes of the 
filler task, participants received the perceptual closure task.  They were asked to press the space 
bar as soon as they recognized the blurred picture. After pressing the button, a window popped up 
and asked participants to type in what they thought represented the degraded picture. No 
feedback was given regarding whether they had answered correctly or not. The pictures were 
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successively presented in a pseudo- random order. Input results and reaction times were 
measured by the E-Prime 2.0 software.  
Results and Discussion 
The mean recognition rate for all studied pictures was 90.97% (SD = 9.15). The mean false 
recognition rate for critical lures was 26.83% (SD = 14.48), which is consistent with previous 
research using visual stimuli to induce false memories (see Israel & Schacter, 1997; Koutstaal, 
Schacter, & Brenner, 2001). Mean false recognition rate for unrelated items was 1.48% (SD = 
3.80).  
Before analyzing the data from the perceptual closure task, we filtered the data based on the 
following criterion (see also Otgaar et al., 2015). First, for studied pictures, we only included the 
reaction times for pictures that participants had recognized in the recognition test. This is to make 
sure they had formed true memories for these pictures. Second, for critical lures, only when 
participants falsely recognized the critical lures as presented during the recognition test were the 
reaction times for these pictures included in the analysis. This again, is to make sure they had 
formed false memories for the critical lure pictures. The above two criteria did not apply to 
pictures in the “no recognition presentation” condition as those pictures were not included in the 
recognition test. Third, pictures that were not identified correctly in the PCT were removed. This 
applied to all studied pictures, critical lures and unrelated items. For instance, if a participant 
pressed the button indicating identification of a picture (e.g., butter) but then did not write an 
answer or filled in an incorrect response (e.g., chocolate), then this was removed from the 
analyses. However, synonyms of the answers were accepted. For example, if a participant 
answered marmalade for a picture depicting jam, the answer was also counted as correct. Less 
than 5% of the accepted answers were synonyms. Of a total of 3484 answers that could be 
provided, 91.8% (N = 3200) were correct and 8.2% were blank or incorrect (N = 284). 
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We conducted a 3 (Memory type: studied items, critical lures, unrelated) ×2 (Recognition 
presentation: yes vs. no) repeated measures ANOVA to examine the PCT reaction time 
differences of the different memory types. Missing data (9 out of 264 cases) were replaced by the 
average value in the corresponding condition. As Figure 2 shows, no statistical interaction effect 
was found, F(2, 86) = 1.63, p = .201,  ƞ²partial = .04. There was a statistically significant main 
effect of memory type, F(2, 86) = 27.51, p < .001, ƞ²partial = .39. Post-hoc Bonferroni tests 
revealed that studied items (M = 3011.63, SE =73.83) were identified statistically faster than 
critical lures (M = 3857.33, SE =136.89; p < .001) and unrelated items (M = 3678.92, SE =116.82; 
p < .001), and the latter two did not differ from each other (p = .718). We also found a significant 
main effect of recognition presentation, F(1, 44) = 12.09, p = .001, ƞ²partial = .22.
  
Figure 2.  Mean reaction times in different Memory type and Recognition presentation  
  conditions. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals (Experiment 1). 
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In the present experiment, we found that studied pictures (true memories) served as better 
primes for the PCT than false memories and the latter did not differ from unrelated pictures. That 
is, when participants were presented on the PCT with a picture of a non-presented critical item, 
they were statistically slower in identifying it than when they were presented with studied 
pictures. When using verbal stimuli (i.e., words), we and others (Howe et al., 2010; Otgaar et al., 
2015) have, however, found that verbal false memories can lead to faster performance on tasks 
such as the PCT. Specifically, in these studies, it was found that false memories and not true 
memories served as the best primes. The current experiment shows that this finding cannot be 
translated to visual false memories or false memories that share more the characteristics of 
everyday experiences (e.g., color, details, etc.). False memories for pictures might not retain 
perceptual information like true memories do. 
Our results on false recognition rates are in line with research on the mechanisms behind 
false recognitions for visual stimuli. In the current experiments, each picture was a visual 
analogue of a list member from the DRM list. Although pictures within one DRM list shared 
semantic relatedness with each other, each picture had distinctive perceptual characteristics. For 
instance, an image of a car differed in shape, color, and other details with a truck. Distinctive 
perceptual information is known to attenuate false memory and results in fewer pictures being 
false recognized (Arndt & Reder, 2003; Howe, 2008). We also found that stimuli presentation 
during recognition test improved reaction speed in the later identification task than when stimuli 
were not presented during the recognition test. However, stimuli exposure in the recognition test 
did not confound the priming effect of memory type.  
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Overall, we found that false memories for visual stimuli were less efficient primes on the 
PCT than visual true memories. We achieved the same results in our pilot experiment (see 
supplementary materials). The results led us to question the nature of mental representations of 
false memories induced by pictorial DRM lists. If false memories for pictures contain imagery 
representations as true memories do, retention of false memories should prime the identification 
of those images. Results from the current experiment did not support this hypothesis.  
One might argue that the slower identification times for critical lure pictures were caused 
because studied pictures were presented more often (i.e., one time extra during the study phase) 
than critical pictures which were only presented during the test phase. To examine this 
hypothesis, we compared studied items that were not included in the recognition test (exposed 
once) with critical lures that were in the recognition test (also exposed once), and we found that 
critical lures were still more slowly identified than studied items, t(43) = 3.43, p < .001(see 
Figure 2). We also looked at the studied items that were only shown in the study phase (exposed 
once) and studied items that went through both study phase and recognition test (exposed twice). 
There was no significant difference in PCT performance, t(43) = 1.96, p > .05, indicating no 
effect of test on PCT performance. These analyses ruled out the possibility that our effects were 
due to the frequency of stimuli exposure. The most plausible explanation would be that mental 
representations for false memories derived from pictorial DRM lists are not visual, but verbal in 
nature. We suggest that false memories elicited by pictorial DRM lists are purely conceptual—
not pictures but words in the mind’s eye.   
According to spreading-activation theories (Howe et al., 2009; Roediger et al., 2001), 
presentation of DRM words activates corresponding concept nodes and this activation 
automatically spreads to interrelated nodes. Thus, non-presented but related concepts could be 
erroneously activated at the encoding phase. When it comes to presenting pictures of DRM list 
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members, visual sensory traces are encoded for studied pictures and at the same time 
corresponding concepts of the pictures are activated automatically (based on the dual coding 
theory); however, such activation of the list members might only spread along the conceptual 
network as the DRM list members are semantically related instead of perceptually related. As a 
result, concepts of critical lures are activated and pictures of critical lures are falsely recognized 
during a recognition test. However, the activation of critical lure concepts might not work on the 
priming of critical lures for pictures. Previous studies have demonstrated the priming effect of 
false memories for verbal stimuli (McDermott, 1997; Otgaar et al., 2015; Tajika et al., 2005). The 
discrepancy between previous studies and our study led us to conduct a second experiment where 
we orthogonally manipulated the modality (picture vs. word) of both the DRM stimuli and the 
PCT. We aimed to test the hypothesis that mental representations of critical lures based on 
pictorial stimuli are conceptual, not perceptual or imaginal, in nature. 
Experiment 2 
 The purpose of Experiment 2 was to examine the priming effect of false memories for 
both visual and verbal stimuli on the PCT in one study. Previous study showed that verbal false 
memories primed the verbal PCT faster than true memories (Otgaar et al., 2015). Our prediction 
was that we would find this effect in Experiment 2 and we predicted that the reverse was true for 
false memories for visual stimuli, i.e. false memories for visual stimuli primed the PCT slower 
than true memories. More importantly, we were interested in whether false memories for visual 
stimuli have priming effects on identification of words. Experiment 2 was an orthogonal design 
with manipulation of verbal vs. visual modalities on both study phase and the PCT. 
Method 
Participants 
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The Cohen’s d between studied items and critical lures was 0.68 in the recognition 
presentation condition and 1.42 in the no recognition presentation condition in Exp. 1. Again, we 
were interested in the reaction time contrast between studied items and critical lures in each 
group. We estimated d = 0.7 and power as 0.8, G. Power analysis showed nineteen participants 
were needed in each group and thus 76 participants were needed in total. Eighty participants were 
tested in Experiment 3. The mean age of the sample was 20.6 years old (SD = 2.20; age range = 
18 to 29 years old). There were 8 males and 72 females. They received credit points or a financial 
compensation (€ 7.50). 
Materials 
Study phase. The nine DRM lists (eight-item per list) from Experiment 1 were used. 
However, Experiment 2 used two sets of stimuli: verbal DRM words and pictorial version of the 
verbal DRM lists. The pictorial version was exactly the same as used in Experiment 1. 
Recognition test. Recognition items were the same as in Experiment 1, except in 
Experiment 3 a verbal version of the recognition items was used as well. In the verbal version, 
each word (e.g., sandwich) was a corresponding concept to a picture in the pictorial version (e.g., 
a picture of a sandwich).  
    Perceptual closure task. The PCT had two versions, a word version and a picture version. 
The two versions contained the same conceptual items of studied and critical items, only with 
different presentation forms. For instance, the item “car” in the word version of the PCT was the 
word car, while in the picture version was a picture of a car. The filtering parameters (level of 
degrading) for words were the same as the filters for pictures in Experiment 1. The word version 
of the PCT included 99 words, consisting of 72 studied words (36 were shown in the recognition 
test and 36 were not), 9 critical lures, 9 related words and 9 unrelated words. The picture version 
of the PCT was composed of 99 pictures, including 72 studied pictures (36 were shown in the 
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recognition test and 36 were not), 9 pictures of critical lures from the recognition test, 9 new 
pictures of the critical lures and 9 unrelated pictures.  
Design and Procedure 
    Experiment 2 involved a 2(DRM modality: picture vs. word) x 2(PCT modality: picture 
vs. word) x 3(Memory: studied items, critical lures, unrelated items) mixed design where the first 
and second factors were between-subjects and the third factor was within-subject. Participants 
were tested individually for approximately 40 minutes in lab facilities. The procedure was exactly 
the same as in Experiment 1, but we manipulated the stimuli modality (picture vs. word) in the 
study phase and in the PCT phase. Thus, we had four groups: (1) picture-picture group, where 
DRM lists were presented in a pictorial form in the study phase and blurred pictures had to be 
identified in the PCT; (2) picture-word group, where pictorial DRM items were presented but 
blurred words for these items had to be identified in the PCT; (3) word-word group, words were 
presented and later identified in the PCT; and (4) word-picture group, where DRM words were 
presented in the study phase and then pictorial forms had to be identified in the PCT. Participants 
were randomly assigned to one of the four groups. To be noted, the modality of the recognition 
test was always consistent with the study phase.  
Results and Discussion 
The mean recognition rates in different groups of participants are shown in Table 1. Eighty 
participants were equally distributed in the four groups. Inspection of Table 1 shows that when 
the DRM lists were presented verbally, the false recognition rates for critical lures were higher 
than when they were presented pictorially (F(1, 78) = 40.88, p < .001). However, this 
discrepancy is not a confounding factor to the PCT results. This is because the data analysis is not 
contingent on differences in true or false memory rates, just that a true or false memory had been 
generated during the recognition test (i.e., we only analyse the PCT data for which true or false 
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recognition occurred). Before analyzing the data from the PCT, we conducted the same filtering 
process as in Experiment 1. That is, first, we focused only on the reaction times of recognized 
studied and critical items and then, within these recognized items, items with incorrect answers 
were removed from the analysis. Of a total of 2595 recognized items, for 10.8% (N=280) items 
participants failed to identify them within 10 s, thus no answers and reaction times were recorded 
by the program; for 5.4% (N=141) of the items, participants provided incorrect answers, of which 
the reaction times were removed from analysis. Incorrect answers in unrelated items were also 
removed. Of a total of 720 unrelated items, participants failed to identify 14.6% (N=105) of the 
items, and answered incorrectly for 11.1% of the items (N=80). Those items were not included in 
analysis. 
Table 1. Mean recognition rates for studied items, critical lures and unrelated items in four groups 
of participants (n: number of participants in that condition). 
 Picture-Picture 
(n=20) 
Picture-Word 
(n=20) 
Word-Picture 
(n=20) 
Word-Word 
(n=20) 
Studied items 87.86% 87.14% 77.43% 79.14% 
Critical lures 26.11% 23.89% 52.22% 50.00% 
Unrelated items 1.11% 0.56% 6.11% 3.89% 
 
The main interest was to compare PCT reaction times to studied items and critical lures in 
each group, so we conducted a 4(Group: picture-picture, picture-word, word-picture, word-word) 
x 3(Memory: studied items, critical lures, unrelated items) repeated measures ANOVA, with 
Group as a between-subjects variable. Because Experiment 1showed that stimuli exposure in the 
recognition test did not interact with the reaction time contrast among studied items, critical lures 
and unrelated items, the items for which reaction times were analyzed below were all presented 
in the recognition test. Missing data (4 out of 240 cells) were replaced by the average value in the 
corresponding condition. A statistically significant interaction effect between Group and Memory 
was found, F(6, 152) = 8.01, p < .001, ƞ²partial = .24 (see Figure 3). There was a main effect of 
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Memory, F(2, 152) = 19.25, p < .001, ƞ²partial = .20, and a main effect of Group, F(3, 76) = 3.86, p 
= .013, ƞ²partial = .13. Simple effect analyses indicated the following: (1) in the picture-picture 
group, studied items (M= 3268, SD=676) primed the PCT significantly faster than critical lures 
(M= 4069, SD=1815; p = .047, Cohen’s d = 0.57) and unrelated items (M= 3558, SD=780; p = 
.03, Cohen’s d = 0.55), and the latter two did not differ from each other (p= .25), which is 
consistent with findings in Experiment 1; however, (2) critical lures (M= 3595, SD= 848) primed 
the PCT significantly faster than studied items (M= 4309, SD=635) in the picture-word group (p 
< .001, Cohen’s d = 0.99), and both were statistically faster than the unrelated items (M= 5027, 
SD= 517; ps < .001, Cohen’s d studied items= 1.40, Cohen’s d critical lures= 2.28 ); (3) in the word-
picture group, critical lures (M= 3731, SD=1073) and studied items (M= 3873, SD= 567) did not 
differ from each other (p = .58), and both did not differ from unrelated items (M= 4217, SD=759; 
ps > .05) in priming the PCT; and (4) in the word-word group, critical lures (M= 3228, SD= 904) 
were significant faster primes than studied items in the PCT (M= 3720, SD= 716; p = .02, 
Cohen’s d = 0.62), and both were faster than unrelated items (M= 4622, SD= 747; ps < .001, 
Cohen’s d studied items= 1.31, Cohen’s d critical lures= 1.68), which replicated the findings by Otgaar et 
al. (2015). 
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Figure 3. Mean reaction times to studied items, critical lures and unrelated items in different 
study/PCT modalities (“Pic” stands for “Picture”). Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals 
(Experiment 2). 
Experiment 2 replicates the results of Experiment 1 that false memories induced by pictorial 
DRM lists primed the pictorial PCT slower than true memories did, and they were no 
significantly different from unrelated pictures. Participants falsely recognized critical lure 
pictures as studied in the recognition test, however false memory activation did not have any 
facilitation on identifying critical lure pictures. Memory activation of studied pictures, on the 
other hand, improved the speed in the identification of studied pictures. Experiment 2 also 
replicates the finding by Otgaar et al. (2015) that verbal false memories induced by verbal DRM 
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lists had a priming effect on the PCT, and this effect was even more superior than that of verbal 
true memories.  
Experiment 2 also provided two new findings. First, we found that both false and true 
memories induced by pictorial DRM lists had a priming effect in the verbal PCT, and the 
magnitude of false memories’ priming effect was larger than that of true memories for pictorial 
DRM lists. This result pattern is the same as in the word-word condition in this experiment, 
where verbal DRM lists were presented and verbal PCT was completed. It can be best explained 
by the assumption that false memories elicited by DRM pictures are verbal in nature. When 
pictures of DRM items were presented, concepts of these items were activated and spread to 
nearby concepts, i.e. critical lures, in a semantic network. The activation of critical lure concepts 
later facilitated the identification of critical lure words. If DRM pictures created visual false 
memories (i.e. vivid imagery representations of critical lure pictures), then visual false memories 
should have a priming effect in the pictorial PCT, which was not found in our two experiments. 
Thus, false memories from pictorial DRM lists should be encoded in other forms, and the Picture-
Word dataset in Experiment 3 supports the verbal form.  
Second, we found that in the word-picture condition, where DRM words were presented and 
pictorial forms were identified in the PCT, neither false memories nor true memories had a 
priming effect. This is logical as in the study phase both verbal true memories and verbal false 
memories were created. According to the spreading-activation theories, conceptual nodes for 
studied items and critical lures are embedded in one semantic network and are both activated 
during study, which means the encodings of true and false memories are both verbal. As a result, 
verbal true memories and verbal false memories should not prime identification of pictures in the 
PCT. 
25  
  
  
A limitation of Experiment 2 is that we asked participants to think about the concepts of the 
pictures during the presentation of pictorial DRM lists. This instruction was borrowed from Israel 
and Schacter (1997) in order to maximize the chances of obtaining false memories of critical 
lures within the DRM paradigm. Nevertheless, it might have switched participants’ attention 
from viewing the pictures to conceptually processing the pictures. Experiment 3 was conducted 
to rule out this possible confounding factor. Here, participants were merely asked to carefully 
view the presented pictures/words during the study phase of Experiment 3. Moreover, data on 
Image Agreement Ratings (Snodgrass & Vanderwart, 1980) of stimuli were obtained and 
reported in Experiment 3. 
Experiment 3 
Method 
Participants 
An a priori sample size estimation was conducted as per Experiment 2, and suggested that at 
least 76 participants were necessary. We tested 84 participants in Experiment 3 (Mage = 20.18, SD 
= 2.76; age range = 18 to 40 years old; 83% female). Participants received credit points for 
participation in the experiment. 
Materials 
The same verbal and pictorial DRM lists (eight-item per list) from Experiment 2 were used. 
For the orientation of the DRM pictures, we used: (1) objects standing in their natural (vertical) 
positions if possible (the car list, the bread list, the fruit list, the shirt list, the cup list, the chair 
list and the foot list); (2) long, thin objects that cannot stand (the needle list and the pen list) 
oriented at 45 degree angle (upper right to lower left). Critical lure pictures were always in the 
same orientation with most members of the corresponding studied list. We administered an Image 
Agreement Ratings questionnaire to 43 participants (Mage = 20.19, SD = 1.97; 88% female), 
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asking them to rate to what extent the DRM picture represents their mental image of the DRM 
word on a 1 to 5 scale (1 = no agreement; 5 = high agreement). Of 54 pictures whose PCT data 
would be entered into data analysis, three pictures (two studied pictures and one unrelated 
pictures) had an average imagery agreement rating lower than 3. Thus, PCT data of these three 
pictures were not entered into analyses. After removing these three pictures, a repeated measures 
ANOVA was conducted to compare the mean imagery agreement ratings among studied pictures 
(M = 4.22, SD = 0.48), critical pictures (M = 4.23, SD = 0.54) and unrelated pictures (M = 4.25, 
SD= 0.46). No statistical difference on imagery agreement ratings was found among different 
type of stimuli, F(2, 84) = 0.16, p = .85, ƞ²partial = .004.  
Design and Procedure 
    Experiment 3 used the same 4 (Group: picture-picture, picture-word, word-picture, and 
word-word) x 3 (Memory: studied items, critical lures, unrelated items) mixed design as in 
Experiment 2, where Group was between-subjects and Memory was within-subject. The 
procedure was identical to that of Experiment 2, except the instruction in the study phase was 
modified such that in Experiment 3 participants were merely asked to view the pictures carefully.  
Results and Discussion 
Mean recognition rates of studied items and critical lures in different groups are shown in 
Table 2. Participants in Experiment 3 had similar false memory rates for critical pictures (~35%) 
with previous experiments (25%~30%). This suggests that telling participants to think about the 
concept of the presented picture or not did not impact false recognition of critical pictures.  
Table 2. Mean recognition rates for studied items, critical lures and unrelated items in four groups 
of participants (n: number of participants in that condition). 
 Picture-Picture 
(n=20) 
Picture-Word 
(n=22) 
Word-Picture 
(n=22) 
Word-Word 
(n=20) 
Studied items 87.95% 87.00% 79.22% 74.45% 
Critical lures 35.63% 35.86% 59.66% 40.00% 
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Unrelated items 1.11% 3.54% 4.55% 3.33% 
 
After filtering wrong answers and non-recognized studied items and critical pictures as in 
previous experiments, a 4 (Group: picture-picture, picture-word, word-picture, word-word) x 3 
(Memory: studied items, critical lures, unrelated items) repeated measures ANOVA was 
conducted, with Group as a between-subjects variable. A statistically significant interaction effect 
between Group and Memory was found, F(6, 152) = 4.26, p = .001, ƞ²partial = .14. There was a 
main effect of Memory, F(2, 152) = 23.06, p < .001, ƞ²partial = .23, and a main effect of Group, 
F(3, 76) = 10.84, p < .001, ƞ²partial = .30.  
As can be seen in Figure 4, and verified using simple effect analyses, the following effects 
were obtained: (1) in the picture-picture group, studied items (M = 3005, SD = 444) primed the 
PCT statistically faster than critical lures (M = 3632, SD = 1249; p = .036, Cohen’s d = 0.65) and 
unrelated items (M = 3799, SD = 830; p = .001, Cohen’s d = 0.98), and the latter two did not 
differ from each other (p = .64), which is consistent with findings in Experiments 1and 2; 
however, (2) in the picture-word group, critical lures (M = 3879, SD = 911) primed the PCT 
significantly faster than studied items (M = 4371, SD = 548)  (p = .005, Cohen’s d = 0.75), and 
both were statistically faster than the unrelated items (M = 5188, SD = 462; ps < .001, Cohen’s d 
studied items = 1.54, Cohen’s d critical lures = 1.62 ), which again replicated results of Experiment 2; (3) 
in the word-picture group, studied items (M = 3728, SD = 450) and critical lures (M = 3673, SD = 
986) did not differ from each other (p = .81), and neither differed from unrelated items (M = 
4081, SD = 890; ps > .05) in priming the PCT; and (4) in the word-word group, critical lures (M 
= 4188, SD = 1361) and studied items (M = 3672, SD = 611) did not statistically differ in priming 
the PCT (p = .10), and both were faster than unrelated items (M = 4678, SD = 611; ps < .05, 
Cohen’s d studied items = 1.74, Cohen’s d critical lures = 0.64). 
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Figure 4. Mean reaction times to studied items, critical lures and unrelated items in different 
study/PCT modalities (“Pic” stands for “Picture”). Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals 
(Experiment 3). 
 
Experiment 3 replicated the results of Experiment 2. The most relevant results are those of 
the picture-picture and picture-word groups. In these two conditions of Experiment 3, participants 
were instructed to view the pictures carefully, which should direct them to perceptually 
processing the pictures. However, without telling participants to think about the concepts of 
DRM pictures, false memories of critical pictures still primed identification of corresponding 
concepts more quickly than true memories of studied pictures (picture-word condition) but lacked 
a priming effect on identification of the exact same critical pictures (picture-picture condition). 
The results of Experiment 3 provide converging support for our hypothesis that false memories 
for visual stimuli are conceptual in nature. 
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General Discussion 
Our experiments focused on the consequences of false memories on an adapted perceptual 
closure task. We investigated the extent to which false memories were better or worse primes on 
the PCT than true memories. After presenting participants with visual DRM stimuli, the majority 
formed false memories for non-presented pictures of critical lures. In all four experiments, we 
found that these false memories did not result in any priming effect in the PCT relative to 
unrelated pictures, while visual true memories exhibited facilitation in priming the PCT. More 
specifically, perceptual priming based on visual true memories was faster than that based on false 
memories for critical lure pictures. However, when we changed the modalities of the study phase 
and the PCT phase in Experiments 2 and 3, we found that false memories for critical lure pictures 
resulted in a larger priming effect than true memories in the verbal PCT.  
Consistent with the spreading-activation theories, our results support the hypothesis that 
false memory representations do not contain perceptual information. Although previous studies 
found that verbal false memories can have priming effects on verbal priming tasks (e.g., the stem 
completion task, McDermott, 1997; McKone & Murphy, 2000), these tasks might include a 
component of conceptual priming and thus, it is not fully justified to interpret them as evidence 
for perceptual priming for false memories. In fact, Hicks and Starn’s (2005) finding of no 
modality specificity for priming in the stem completion task provides evidence for the conceptual 
priming in the stem completion task. However, with only verbal priming tasks, Hicks and Starn’s 
study (2005) cannot provide direct evidence regarding whether false memory representation is 
perceptual or not. By using pictorial stimuli, our study showed that identification of degraded 
pictures was not facilitated by critical lure pictures, which provides strong and direct evidence for 
the non-perceptual view of false memory representations.  
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We consistently found in three experiments that false memories for pictures primed the PCT 
more slowly than true memories for pictures. However, in the picture-word group, we found that 
false memories for pictures had a priming effect in the verbal PCT. To explain the contrasting 
findings, our interpretation is that memory representations underlying false memories for visual 
stimuli might be purely verbal or conceptual. Theoretically, this can be explained as follows. The 
dual coding theory posits that true memories for visual stimuli have two forms of memory coding, 
imaginal and verbal (Paivio, 1991). In the study phase, true memories for DRM pictures (e.g., a 
picture of an apple) are encoded as imaginal representations (e.g., image of an apple) as well as 
verbal representations (e.g., the concept “apple”). The activation of verbal representations is 
automatic according to the dual-coding theory, and this activation spreads through a semantic 
network which activates nearby concepts of critical lures (Howe et al., 2009; Roediger et al., 
2001). Thus, true memories for visual stimuli are encoded into imaginal and verbal forms while 
false memories for visual stimuli are only encoded into verbal forms. This interpretation can 
indeed explain our findings. Since true memories for pictures possess imaginal representations 
while false memories do not, true memories primed identification of pictures faster than false 
memories in the pictorial PCT. Since false memories for pictures possess conceptually-based 
representations like true memories do, critical lure pictures had a priming effect on the verbal 
PCT.  
Interestingly, the above-mentioned explanation is in line with Fuzzy-trace Theory (Brainerd 
& Reyna, 2002; Brainerd, Reyna, & Ceci, 2008). According to the Fuzzy-trace Theory, two 
independent memory traces, verbatim and gist, are formed when people encode stimuli. Verbatim 
traces refer to episodic representations of the surface forms of experienced items, which 
correspond to the perceptual representations. Gist traces are interpretations of concepts (e.g., 
meanings) that are retrieved from the surface forms, which correspond to the conceptual aspect of 
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mental representations. Fuzzy-trace Theory proposes that both verbatim (or perceptual) traces 
and gist traces contribute to true memories but only gist traces contribute to the formation of false 
memories. Related to our results, true memories of pictures thus primed identification of both 
blurred pictures and words while false memories of pictures only primed identification of words. 
Our hypothesis is consistent with neuroimaging findings on brain activity differences 
between true and false memories for visual stimuli. In Slotnick and Schacter’s (2004, 2006) 
studies, participants studied sets of exemplar shapes and formed false memories for non-
presented but related shapes. Researchers found that true recognition for images revealed more 
activities in the early visual cortex compared with false recognition. Stark, Okado, and Loftus 
(2010) also found stronger activation for visual true memories in early visual processing areas, 
which are mostly concerned with sensory processing of visual details. Schacter, Chamberlain, 
Gaesser, and Gerlach (2012) suggest that true memories are accompanied by reactivation of 
sensory encoding processes that were engaged during the establishment of true but not false 
memories. We posit that true memory for visual stimuli contain imaginal and verbal 
representations while false memory for visual stimuli possesses only verbal representations, at 
least when they are evoked in the DRM paradigm. Activation in early visual areas probably 
corresponds to the imaginal representation for visual true memory, which can provide a neural 
basis for the differentiation of memory encoding between true and false memories for visual 
stimuli.  
Another interesting finding is that in the picture-word and word-word conditions, false 
memories sometimes primed the PCT even faster than true memories. This finding can be 
explained by the principle of additivity in the spreading-activation theory of false memory. The 
principle of additivity suggests that activation of the critical lure can summate to produce greater 
priming effect under multiple sources of activation (e.g., multiple DRM studied items) than under 
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a single source of activation (e.g., a studied item) (Roediger et al., 2001; Meade, Hutchison, & 
Rand, 2010). That is, during the study phase each concept of the DRM list was probably activated 
once while the concept of the critical lure had more chance of activating multiple times. Thus, 
false memories primed the identification of concepts faster than true memories. 
The finding of false memories’ superior priming effect demonstrates the adaptive nature of 
memory as well. In recent years, studies have accumulated showing that false memories have 
adaptive value and can exhibit positive consequences under certain conditions (Howe, 2011; 
Schacter, 2012). By “positive consequences” it means that false memories show the same 
efficiency as true memories or even exert more efficiency (i.e., faster identification) than true 
memories in solving PCT problems. It has been well established by previous studies that verbal 
false memories can have salutary consequences. Verbal false memories are found to be 
associated with convergent thinking--a component of creativity (Dewhurst, Thorley, Hammond, 
& Ormerod, 2011). Recent studies have confirmed that false memories derived from DRM 
paradigm solved the PCT faster, solved associative problems faster, and solved analogical 
problems faster than true memories (Howe, Garner, & Patel, 2013; Otgaar et al., 2015; Wilkinson, 
Howe, & Monaghan, 2018). In our experiments, we replicated previous findings in the word-
word group and added another new condition (i.e., picture-word) where false memories exhibit 
positive consequences as well. Our study suggests that, as long as true and false memories share 
the same memory activation/representation mechanism (e.g., derived from the same semantic 
memory network), false memories can have beneficial effects on related tasks (e.g., a semantic 
associative task). 
Some caveats are worth mentioning. In previous studies, participants reported vividly seeing 
pictures when words were shown and sometimes even seeing pictures that were not shown (Foley, 
2012; Foley & Foy, 2008; Weinstein & Shanks, 2010). These false memories were reported with 
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high confidence and a feeling of recollection. Indeed, false memories are caused by different 
types of associations (e.g., conceptual, perceptual; Howe et al., 2009; Pesta, Murphy, & Sanders, 
2001). Although our data in the word-picture condition did not support the perceptual priming of 
words on identifying corresponding pictures, we were using the DRM paradigm in all three 
experiments, which might be a limitation of our study. For instance, Weinstein and Nash (2013) 
found perceptual priming for false memories using a visual scene scenario, although they did not 
control the recognition presentation and their effect size was not large. Moreover, we asked 
participants to “view the pictures carefully” to guide their attention to perceptually processing the 
stimuli. Future studies may consider using encoding instructions that focus even more on 
processing perceptual elements such as color and shape. Further research is needed to examine 
the underlying representation of false memories by using other false memory paradigms and tasks.  
One might ask whether results in our experiments were due to item effects. Data from 
previous PCT research and data from the current experiments indicate that this is probably not the 
case. In the verbal PCT study of Otgaar et al. (2015) and associative problem-solving tasks by 
Howe et al. (e.g., 2010, 2016), the issue of possible item effects has been handled by comparing 
presented critical lures and non-presented critical lures. These studies still found a priming effect 
for non-presented critical lures, which is consistent with our results in the word-word condition. 
As for the results in the picture-picture condition, the pictures in Experiment 1 and our pilot 
experiment were different stimuli, but we achieved the same results in the two experiments, 
which eliminates the possibility that our results were due to the use of specific materials. 
Furthermore, DRM lists in three Experiments were all about familiar objects. We have controlled 
for the concreteness, name agreement, and image agreement of studied items and critical lures:  a 
pilot name agreement study indicated that both studied pictures and critical pictures were easy to 
identify (both > 96%, see Materials of Exp. 1); and an image agreement ratings questionnaire 
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showed that participants’ mental images of DRM items were in high accordance with the pictures 
used in our experiments (~ 4.2 in a 1-5 scale, see Materials of Exp. 3).  
Some might argue that the different performance between visual true and false memories on 
the PCT is due to mere stimuli exposure:  studied pictures were presented more often than the 
critical lures and unrelated pictures (during study phase). What we want to argue here is that we 
only included reaction times for pictures in which participants responded with “yes” during the 
recognition test. For studied pictures, only pictures they had recognized in the recognition test 
were entered into analysis to make sure we were analysing true memories. The same is true for 
critical lures that only pictures that were falsely remembered were analysed. This means that the 
comparison level is not stimuli exposure versus no stimuli exposure, but true versus false 
memory. Furthermore, we examined whether stimuli exposure could explain our effects but we 
did not find any evidence for this idea. What we want to stress here is that, unlike verbal false 
memories, false memories for visual stimuli are processed in a way not different from unrelated 
pictures, and both are more slowly processed than visual true memories. Research on false 
memories relies heavily on paradigms using verbal stimuli. Studying false memories for stimuli 
with more ecological validity such as images and events might contribute to a more complete 
picture of false memory mechanism(s). 
To summarize, our experiments provide a first examination of the perceptual priming effect 
of false memories for visual stimuli in the DRM paradigm. We found that false memories for 
pictures did not prime identification of degraded pictures, but they had a priming effect on 
identifying blurred words. Based on these results, we suggest that true and false memories differ 
in the way they are encoded in that true memories for visual stimuli have both verbal and 
imaginal memory traces while false memories for visual stimuli are only encoded in a verbal 
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form. Our results contribute to a more complete picture about the differentiation between true and 
false memories and have implications concerning the underlying mechanisms of false memories.  
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Appendix A: DRM lists 
  Pen Bread Chair Foot Fruit Shirt Cup Needle Car 
Pencil butter table shoe apple Blouse Mug thread truck 
fountain sandwich legs hand vegetable sleeves saucer pin Bus 
leak Rye seat toe orange pants tea eye Train 
quill Jam couch sandals kiwi tie coaster point Jeep 
marker Milk desk soccer citrus button handle prick Ford 
Bic flour recliner heel pear jacket coffee thimble Keys 
scribble dough sofa ankle banana collar straw haystack garage 
crayon crust wood arm berry vest goblet thumb tyre 
 
Appendix B: Example of degraded representation of the pictures in the perceptual closure 
task (car) 
         
   
 
   
 
 
